Less than a week after a 24-hour Azerbaijani military operation forced the surrender of the ethnic Armenian administration in Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Azerbaijan’s western exclave, signifying Turkey’s growing influence and clout in the South Caucasus.
Erdogan met his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Alyiv on Monday in Azerbaijan’s western Nakhchivan exclave, which borders Turkey and Armenia but has no land connection with the rest of Azerbaijan.
The Turkish president praised Azerbaijan’s 24-hour Sept. 19-20 operation against Karabakh, declaring it a “matter of pride” that it was “successfully completed in a short period of time, with utmost sensitivity to the rights of civilians.”
Authorities in Karabakh claim the offensive killed at least 200 people, with many more missing. As Erdogan spoke, Armenians fled Karabakh for fear of what might happen them after Azerbaijani troops consolidated complete control over the enclave.
“I’m very pleased to be with all of you as we connect Nakhchivan with the Turkish world,” Erdogan said.
That comment and the timing of his visit to Nakhchivan, as opposed to the capital, Baku, was significant. His mentioning of linking Nakhchivan with the Turkish world was undoubtedly a reference to the so-called Zangezur corridor Azerbaijan has been demanding Armenia let it establish through its southern Syunik province.
Nagorno-Karabakh is located within Azerbaijan and recognized worldwide as rightfully Baku’s, despite having a sizable ethnic Armenian population estimated to number 120,000. The Zangezur corridor, on the other hand, demands territorial concessions from Armenia itself. Turkey backs Azerbaijan’s insistence on implementing this project to connect Nakhchivan directly with the rest of Azerbaijan through sovereign Armenian territory.
Establishing the Zangezur corridor is Baku’s prerequisite for a full-fledged peace treaty and recognition of Armenia within its Soviet-era boundaries, as the current Armenian government proposed, and full normalization of relations with Turkey. However, that corridor would also effectively cut Iran off from the Caucasus and deny Tehran an overland connection with Russia, with which it has established strategic ties in recent years. That is one reason Iran staunchly opposes it and may even intervene if Azerbaijan attempts to make it a reality.
Iran, like Russia, was caught off guard in the 44-day Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (Sept. 27-Nov. 10, 2020) when Azerbaijan launched a sophisticated military assault on Nagorno-Karabakh. Using advanced Israeli and Turkish systems, especially armed drones, Baku inflicted a devastating blow against the Armenian military and moved to reconsolidate its control over the enclave.
Tehran, preoccupied with the situation in the Middle East and still reeling from heightened tensions with the U.S. following the assassination of Iranian Major-General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq early that year, was caught by surprise. Although an ally of Armenia, it endorsed Azerbaijan’s claim over Karabakh and offered to mediate between the two rivals.
On his visit to Azerbaijan following its 2020 victory, Erdogan irked Iran when he quoted an Azeri poem lamenting how the Aras River unjustly separates Azeri people in Azerbaijan from their ethnic kin in northwest Iran. The poem had sensitive connotations regarding Iranian sovereignty over its northwestern Azeri-majority provinces.
In the years since Iran has had on-and-off military tensions with Azerbaijan. Overall, Tehran’s influence in the region, especially its ability to shape events, seems to be declining. It may well diminish even further if it fails to dissuade or actively deter Azerbaijan from pushing ahead with the Zangezur corridor with Turkey’s backing.
In 2021, Erdogan and Aliyev signed the Shusha Declaration, expanding bilateral military and security cooperation.
In September 2022, with Russia preoccupied with Ukraine, Azerbaijan engaged Armenia in ferocious border clashes that killed 300 people. In December, it blockaded Karabakh’s only land connection to Armenia, the Lachin corridor, to pressure the population and authorities there to capitulate, which they did following this month’s lightning assault.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan slammed his country’s “ineffective” security alliance with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) following Azerbaijan’s latest military action. Pashinyan has repeatedly criticized the CSTO and Russia’s security commitments in recent months, leading to tensions between the two countries, with Russian officials even blaming Armenia for recent developments.
Russia initially saved face and seemingly its relevance in its South Caucasus backyard by brokering a ceasefire to end the 2020 war and deploying peacekeepers. To Yerevan’s dismay, however, these peacekeepers failed to prevent the Azerbaijani blockade and the ensuing military operation.
Azerbaijani fire even killed five Russian troops during the assault on Karabakh, including the deputy commander of Russia’s North Fleet submarine forces. The massive influx of displaced Karabakh Armenians seeking protection from peacekeepers in Karabakh’s Stepanakert airport has drawn comparisons to the chaotic scenes at Kabul airport during America’s August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan.
(It’s also worth remembering that at the end of the 2020 war, Azerbaijan shot down a Russian Mi-24 helicopter gunship flying inside Armenian airspace, killing two of its three crew members. Baku apologized, claiming it was an accident.)
Turkey and Azerbaijan likely view the widening rift between traditional allies Armenia and Russia positively since it potentially enables them to exert greater pressure on Yerevan. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s evident distrust of Armenia’s democratically-elected leader is also something these allies can leverage to their advantage. Azerbaijan will likely follow up its dissolution of Armenian self-rule in Nagorno-Karabakh by increasing pressure on Armenia to make concessions on the Zangezur corridor.
With Turkey’s support, this project will further weaken Yerevan and entrench Ankara’s foothold and influence in that economically and strategically important region. Aside from directly linking Nakhchivan to the rest of Azerbaijan, the Zangezur corridor will also give Turkey a land connection with Baku and realize Erdogan’s ambition of establishing closer links with Central Asia’s Turkic countries and communities. It will also bolster Turkey’s already significant influence in a region Russia and Iran have long viewed as their backyard and traditional sphere of influence.
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