Israel’s small but effective navy is often overlooked as the IDF takes on major operations in Gaza. But it adds both capability and deterrence to the country’s defense.
Effectively established in 1948, the Israeli Navy (IN) currently operates a range of surface ships and boats up to Corvette-sized vessels. They act as air defense units, sea-control and interdiction vessels, missile-strike platforms, patrol and harbor security assets. The IN also operates two classes of submarines with what is widely believed to be a second-strike nuclear capability.
Formally a part of the Israeli Defense Forces, the IN has been in the news this week as it has intercepted and neutralized Hamas divers attempting to infiltrate southern Israel from the water near the Gaza coastline. But its impact on the current conflict is far broader than meeting Hamas militants face to face.
As before, its control of the Israel Exclusive Economic Zone of the Mediterranean Sea and surrounding areas has limited the flow of outside weapons, personnel and support to Gaza. The Navy is also vital to protecting Israel’s offshore natural gas rigs which provide most of the country’s electric supplies.
With Israel’s consent to delay its Gaza incursion (announced on Monday) following a U.S. request to allow the Pentagon time to rush air-defense systems to the region to protect U.S. troops serving in Iraq, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – the IN will need to redouble its efforts to prevent re-supply of Gaza by sea all along the Gaza Strip from Iran-backed proxy groups.
Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and expert in naval affairs, notes that Israel, in concert with Egypt, has used its Navy to blockade the Gaza Strip over the last decade-and-a-half.
“It has been pretty effective. That’s why [Hamas] has aggressively pursued tunnels to get past the border-crossing into Egypt where most of their illicit supplies have come through. Anything substantial coming from the sea is generally intercepted by the Israeli Navy which has a robust surveillance network and patrol craft which operate there.”
But the IN faces a broader challenge now with continued efforts to smuggle weapons supplies into Gaza compounded by threats (and rocket fire) from Lebanon and Syria to the north and potential missile fire into southern Israel from places like Yemen where Houthi missile batteries operate.
“They may need to use the Israeli Navy to patrol other areas,” Clark said in a phone interview. “They’ve been able to concentrate on their coast for a long time and monitor Gaza closely. Now they’re going to have to think about dispersing that effort.”
That could spread IN ships down into the Red Sea and further north in the Mediterranean including waters off of Lebanon. The potentially larger sea front explains the dispatch of U.S. Navy ships to the area to provide additional capacity to maintain a maritime cordon and free up Israeli Navy assets to focus more along its coast and borders, Clark says.
Hamas or other groups might consider targeting Israel’s offshore natural gas rigs but they are far enough off the coast that such an exploit would be difficult. It is nonetheless possible Clark acknowledges.
“The Israelis monitor those rigs normally, but they’re not perceived as being under high threat. Now, engaged in Gaza and with other state-sponsored actors like Hezbollah coming into play, you have to worry about potential threats to those platforms… Israel has become an attractive enough target that countries that might have sat on the sidelines may support third-party groups to possibly go and attack those.”
When the IDF does push into Gaza, Hamas fighters will be dug in, hidden in structures and the tunnel network. But as they are threatened and forced out, they will naturally fall back to the beach where they will likely try to escape to the south or otherwise attempt flanking maneuvers.
“Usually, [the Israelis] are worried about things getting into Gaza, weapons and other useful military items,” Clark notes. “But the idea of [Hamas] exfiltration is also a concern. They could modify and take boats allowing them to go [by sea] circumvent Israeli border fencing.”
The IN monitors the shoreline for such activity, leveraging on-shore surveillance (aerial and terrestrial). Clark says the Israelis could bring their Sa’ar 5 and Sa’ar 6-class Corvettes to bear here, detecting movement of larger boats on the water offshore seeking to ingress or egress the coast.
These Corvettes, the IN’s Sa’ar 4.5 missile boats and Dvora patrol boats could also supply precision missile fires from the water using a combination of AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, SPIKE NLOS missiles, RGM-84 Harpoon and Gabriel V missiles. They could also provide fire support with 76 mm main guns and a variety of Phalanx or 20-30mm cannon and machine guns.
Israeli Navy unmanned surface vessels including Rafael’s Protector – a 30-foot rigid-hulled inflatable USV with an electro-optic surveillance and targeting system and Mini Typhoon weapons station – will also be available to intercept small vessels and even swimmers.
Israel’s Sa’ar 5 and 6 Corvettes could have an auxiliary air defense role given their integration of the maritime version of the Iron Dome missile-defense systems. They would need to be close to shore however.
“Iron Dome is only able to do short range air defense of something nearby,” Clark points out. “In theory [Sa’ar 5s, 6s] could provide defense to coastal areas from Hamas rockets if the geometry works out but that pins those ships down.”
The Israeli’s Dvora and Shaldag-class patrol boats operate closer to shore as the Navy’s primary green water interdiction platforms but must be rotated to allow for crew changes (nine to 15 members) and refueling. The IN has smaller 30-foot Defender-class harbor security/fast response boats to call on as well.
These fast patrol boats and harbor vessels offer some latitude for the Israeli Navy to dispatch its Corvettes to the border with and coast of Lebanon for intelligence gathering purposes.
“The Sa’ar 5s and Sa’ar 6s have an ELINT [electronic intelligence] capability. They may not be able to analyze [data] onboard because their small crews [70-75] may not have intel analysts but they can send information ashore for assessment.”
The Israeli Navy’s submarines, while capable of intelligence gathering, couldn’t do so in shallow water, limiting their land intel utility. Theirs is a more strategic role Clark concludes and Israel is unlikely to involve them unless the conflict escalates out of control.
“They’re going to keep their submarines at sea to avoid detection and maintain their second-strike capability [conventional or nuclear] if they do get into a larger confrontation. Israel will want to maintain the submarines as a backstop.”
The heart of the IN’s capability rests with the Sa’ar 5 and 4.5 Corvettes Clark asserts thanks to their numbers and more than adequate offensive capability to interdict Hamas while maintaining the ability to address threats from Hezbollah and Yemen.
“They’re the workhorses. They can basically keep Hamas hemmed-in from the sea.”
There’s no question that the Israeli Navy brings something to the fight and that without it, Hamas would have far greater freedom to strike outside the Gaza Strip, to resupply or retreat.
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